A. INTRODUCTION
Despite a relatively high demand for personnel per capita, Taiwan plans to completely transition to an all-volunteer active-duty military by 2014. Thereafter, it faces a long-term decline in the youth population. With high demand and declining supply, a major challenge for Taiwan will be personnel costs. This paper explores the issue and suggests ways for meeting the challenge.
I start by placing Taiwan's problem in an international context. However, most of the paper discusses policies for lowering personnel costs by reducing demand and increasing supply. The U.S. experience is drawn upon for examples of policies, both good and bad. I conclude with a research agenda to develop required manpower policies for Taiwan. Table 1 compares the demand for military personnel in the United States and selected Asian countries. A far larger fraction of Taiwan's total population is on active duty than is the case in the United States. After completing the transition from a draft in 2014, Taiwan may have a larger fraction of its population in the active military than any other country with a volunteer force. As its youth population shrinks, this situation will be exacerbated. But while the challenge facing Taiwan is substantial, it is not unprecedented. The fraction of the U.S. population in the active military during the cold war exceeded that of Taiwan today. In 1962, before the escalation of the war in Vietnam, 1.5 percent of the U.S. population was in the military. At that time the United States still had conscription but draft calls were very low, so it was essentially a volunteer force. In 1974, when the all-volunteer force was successfully launched in the United States, one percent of the population was on active duty.
B. HIGH DEMAND FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL

C. DECLINING SUPPLY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL
Motivated by a desire to professionalize its military, Taiwan started to reduce conscription in 2005. By 2008 non-conscripts accounted for 60 percent of the force. It is expected that conscription for the active force will be eliminated by 2014.
While the male youth population in Taiwan will remain stable over the next 10 years, it will decline markedly after that ( Table 2 ). Considering that Taiwan requires an unusually high percentage of its population to serve in the military, this trend will pose a particular challenge. We now turn to the tools available for dealing with this kind of challenge and the risks that can arise when they are not used effectively.
D. MANAGING A VOLUNTEER MILITARY
Cautionary Tale
The United States has been operating a successful all-volunteer military for 35
years. The military leadership recognizes that the quality, experience, and motivation of personnel are higher today than they were under conscription. But managing the allvolunteer force has not been trouble free. Recruiting in a volunteer environment is inherently cyclical. It is harder to attract recruits in economically good times and easier in bad times.
As Figure 1 shows, the number of high-quality recruits-high-school graduates 
Management Principles
Several overarching principles should be borne in mind when considering the design and management of an all-volunteer force:
• Reduce the demand for male recruits. Consider alternative sources of manpower and retain people longer. If fewer people leave, fewer recruits are needed.
• Keep strategic goals in mind. From an economist's perspective, the purpose of a military compensation system is to provide the human resources needed to accomplish strategic goals. Other goals-rewarding people after the fact for patriotic service and providing equal compensation for all of a given rank-can be pursued, but they will likely raise the cost of providing the human resources necessary to accomplish strategic goals.
• Provide incentives. In a volunteer environment the only way to overcome difficulties in attracting and retaining the desired number and kind of people is to make it more attractive for them to enter and remain in the military. That is not to say that patriotism does not attract people to the military, but patriotism is not the only thing most people consider when choosing to join or remain in military service. Pay matters too.
These principles allow us to identify a range of ways in which Taiwan can ease recruiting problems. For example the demand for male recruits can be reduced by:
• Broadening the market. Greater reliance on women, civilian employees, and contractors would reduce the number of male recruits needed and make filling requirements easier.
• Using people who can be drawn on in an emergency to fill roles that don't require full-time peacetime attention. Reservists fall into this category, as do contractors who are offered contingency contracts to provide services on short 5 notice when needed. Greater reliance on post-mobilization assets reduces the need for active-duty recruits.
• Increasing retention. This can be done by paying career personnel more, targeting pay increases on specific problem areas, requiring long-term commitments before providing marketable skills, and not providing unintended incentives to leave (like early retirement and post-service educational benefits). The supply of recruits can be expanded by:
• Raising pay for recruits. This was essential to the initial success of the allvolunteer force in the United States. Entry-level pay was raised by 68 percent in late 1971 and additional increases followed. 2 • Devoting more resources to recruiting and advertising. 3 • Taking advantage of economic downturns. Recall from Figure 1 that it is easier to recruit high-quality personnel when the civilian economy is less attractive.
The remainder of this section discusses some of these options in greater detail, drawing on American experience to illustrate their use. 
Reducing the Demand for Male Recruits a. Increasing Reliance on Women
6
In part, this trend reflects changes in societal attitudes toward women in the military; it also reflects a conscious decision on the part of personnel managers to recruit more women specifically to reduce the requirement for male recruits.
b. Civilianization
Some skills the military needs are not intrinsically military. They draw on the same kinds of ability as civilian jobs of the same kind do. These may include occupations like lawyers, doctors, information technology support technicians, and some administrative functions. Perhaps some positions in these occupations should be filled by military personnel, but the requirement for uniformed people should not be taken for granted.
Civilians may be less expensive than military personnel, especially in a tight labor market for military manpower. Also, they draw on different manpower pools, ones with fewer age restrictions, for example.
A few years ago the U.S. Defense Department made a concerted effort with modest success to identify military billets that could be effectively civilianized. Almost 10,000 medical positions were shifted from uniformed personnel to civilians. This was not an easy process. The military medical establishment was not anxious to eliminate active duty positions it was accustomed to having. The leadership of the military services was ultimately convinced that civilianization was a cost-effective alternative that could focus military personnel on more inherently military tasks.
c. Recruiting versus Retention
One virtue of a volunteer military is that people will stay in service longer on average. If all entry-level personnel want to be in their military jobs, more will want to stay, reducing the need for new entry-level recruits. Figure 3 shows that both average age and level of experience of enlisted servicemembers rose after the end of conscription. The average experience level increased by over a year, from 70 months in 1974 to 83 months in 2004. The bulge of even higher experience levels in the 1990s was due to the low levels of recruiting that followed the end of the cold war.
Offering incentives to increase retention will raise the fraction of personnel who remain on active service, reducing the need for new recruits. Educational benefits available to veterans have recently been expanded. Not only do they cover the cost of college tuition at most public institutions, they also provide the same housing benefits available to active-duty personnel, which often amount to over $10,000 a year.
The Department of Veterans Affairs provides medical services and disability payments to veterans. Disability compensation is available for injuries and illnesses that occurred during the period of active service even if they are not work-related. The
Department of Veterans Affairs spends over $80 billion a year.
Because deferred compensation accounts for over half of U.S. spending on military personnel, it must have a substantial impact on retention. 5 The magnitude of deferred compensation in the United States is not the result of the use of incentives to shape the force in a particular way. It stems in part from once having had a conscript force. In that sense, deferred compensation can be seen as a way to make up for having underpaid conscripts when they were on active duty. It also stems in part from the desire of Congress to be generous to veterans.
It is true that generous deferred compensation does induce additional people to join the military in the first place, but it is not an efficient recruiting tool. Research has shown 9 that new recruits have high discount rates. 6 Since Taiwan wants to efficiently encourage accessions while not discouraging retention, suggestions to increase deferred compensation should be considered carefully before adoption.
That is, they are influenced much more by money now than by promises of money in the future. It is not efficient for the United
States to have so much of its personnel benefits in the form of deferred compensation.
Increasing the Supply of Recruits a. Compensation and Recruiting Success
Our emphasis will now shift from tools that can reduce the need for young male recruits to those that make it easier to fill the demand for them. Increasing salaries is the most obvious way to induce a greater supply of new recruits. It is also the most widely studied. A substantial body of econometric research shows a reliable, statistically significant relationship between military pay and recruiting success.
Analyses performed at the Institute for Defense Analyses indicate that a 10 percent increase in military pay relative to civilian pay can be expected to induce a 7-percent increase in the number of high-quality recruits enlisting in the Army. Other research has estimated an even greater impact. During the boom of the 1990s, military pay lagged civilian pay and Army recruiting fell by 15 percent as a result.
In the early 1980s, pay increases of over 25 percent late in the Carter administration and early in the Reagan administration overcame the greatest threat to the viability of the all-volunteer force, which arose because of a failure of military pay to keep pace during the high inflation of the 1970s. Shortly after the pay increases were approved, the economy went into a recession. The combined effects of these factors completely changed the recruiting environment. 7 In order to assure that military pay does not fall too low, the United States military tries to maintain compensation levels at least equal to that of the 70th percentile of civilian employees of similar age and educational attainment. This level was selected as a result of experience. Whenever compensation fell below the 70th percentile, problems resulted. Evidence indicates that military pay in Taiwan falls short of this level. 8
b. Occupational Targeting of Compensation
Attracting and retaining people in some occupations requires the military to pay more than in other occupations. Higher pay may be needed because of competition from civilian employers; examples of such occupations may include information technology and health professions. It also may be needed to compensate for dangerous or unpleasant working conditions; submarine service and handling explosives may be examples of this.
The U.S. military offers various forms of bonuses for selected occupations. Table 3 shows that recruiting and retention bonuses are offered to a relatively small proportion of the enlisted population, but such bonuses can amount to a significant increase in compensation for those who are eligible. Some special occupational pays are not explicitly linked to recruiting or retention but, in fact, are offered to induce continuing service. Table 4 lists some of these. They can be quite substantial, particularly for highly demanded medical specialties. While special pay and targeted bonuses are expensive, they are often better than the alternatives. The cost of paying everyone of a given rank the same amount while paying enough to attract people in hard-to-fill occupations is even more expensive.
Failure to meet the market price for specialized skills will lead to personnel shortages. 
E. IDENTIFYING THE BEST MIX OF POLICIES
Elements of an Analytic Program
Building such a program will take time. Necessary steps include:
• Specifying initial targets for manpower requirements. This includes the desired distribution of experience levels, the occupational mix, and the numbers of active and reserve personnel. These components will likely change as more is learned about alternatives. For example, it may turn out that a more experienced force than was originally specified could be both cheaper and better.
• Identifying the policy tools that are available or can be obtained. These include things like recruiting more women, raising pay in general, and using targeted compensation.
• Developing the data needed to support empirical analysis. Economic models can be based on informed speculation; sometimes this approach is necessary. But models are likely to be more accurate if they are based on observed behavior.
• Building quantitative models relating policy choices to results and costs. Initial parameter estimates can be derived from analysis of the behavior of nonconscripts in the past, perhaps supplemented by extrapolations from the private sector.
• Providing a framework for integrating tools. This can provide policy makers with a tool for assessing the tradeoffs associated with various alternatives, including cost.
• Committing to research. Analysis must adapt to changes in circumstances. New issues will arise and require empirical investigation. Also, relationships between policies and responses can vary over time. One must be vigilant to recognize when this happens and modify models appropriately. Models must reflect current reality to be useful.
Potential Areas for Analysis
Taiwan would likely benefit from analysis of the following topics:
• Supply elasticities. How much does money matter for accessions and for retention? This kind of analysis has been the backbone of manpower modeling in the United States.
• The effect of the economy, demography, and other things on recruiting. We have found that the state of the economy makes a huge difference in the market for military manpower. This is likely true in Taiwan as well. Broad demographic trends-not just the size of youth cohorts, but how highly educated they are, for example-will also affect the supply of service members.
• Opportunities to expand the market. Taking advantage of such opportunities could be important for a country with such a large military relative to its population.
• Responding to occupational market variations. Understanding this kind of variation can help fill requirements without spending more than is necessary.
• The effect of the deferred compensation. The United States has probably gone too far in the direction of deferred compensation. Perhaps Taiwan can avoid this fate.
• Integration of supply and demand. It is important to understand how the myriad tools available fit together in meeting overall requirements. This is an area where American analysis has lagged, and I think U.S. policy decisions have suffered as a result.
In summary, good policies are easier to develop if you have a quantitative basis for projecting their impact. Economic analysis can provide this basis.
